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Abstract—The recent spades of cyber security attacks have compromised end users’ data safety and privacy in Medical
Cyber-Physical Systems (MCPS). Traditional standard encryption algorithms for data protection are designed based on a viewpoint of
system architecture rather than a viewpoint of end users. As such encryption algorithms are transferring the protection on the data to
the protection on the keys, data safety and privacy will be compromised once the key is exposed. In this paper, we propose a secure
data storage and sharing method consisted by a selective encryption algorithm combined with fragmentation and dispersion to protect
the data safety and privacy even when both transmission media (e.g. cloud servers) and keys are compromised. This method is based
on a user-centric design that protects the data on a trusted device such as end user’s smartphone and lets the end user to control the
access for data sharing. We also evaluate the performance of the algorithm on a smartphone platform to prove the efficiency.
Index Terms—Data security, CPS, edge computing selective encryption, data privacy
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is an integration of computation,
including the cyber world (i.e. computers and the Internet)
and the physical processes through computer networks.
One important use case is a distinct class of CPS deployed
in medical usage that combines smart medical devices,
embedded software, and networking capabilities such as
cloud computing which is referred as Medical Cyber-Physical
System (MCPS) [1].
As shown in Fig. 1, in a cloud-based MCPS, the Elec-
tronic Health Record (EHR) [2] can be stored and transmitted
through cloud servers for other big data based applications.
Collecting EHR data can not only help patients get better
treatment from better hospital remotely but also provide
inputs for research institutes for further pharmacy or study.
Real-time health data monitoring by the disease control de-
partment can also improve the efficiency to prevent spread-
able diseases.
As EHR data is always sensitive, security and safety
must be concerned when building such data sharing and
processing system [3]. Existing proposals for MCPS [4] are
more system-oriented rather than user-centric. For instance,
the data preprocessing and protection scheme are deployed
on clouds or third party servers that may involve plain data
transmission on insecure Internet channels. Cloud service
providers may also be unreliable due to the following two
reasons. On one hand, any third party server may be curious
as data privacy may be violated, for profiting by commercial
purpose such as data mining based advertising. On the
other hand, user behavior reports [5] showed that end users
may use the repeated or similar keys everywhere leading
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to potential dictionary attacks to their EHR data on clouds
once keys are leaked from other sources.
Thus, with the preliminary that the cloud server cannot
be totally trusted and the keys are vulnerable due to many
practical reasons, we aim to provide EHR data safety and
privacy from a user-centric viewpoint. More specifically,
a design considering key reusing or exposure is required
which means more protection methods must be introduced
except only standard encryption algorithms. For instance,
traditional data protection methods are basically key distri-
butions or encryption algorithms which requires strong and
different keys all the time. However, considering user be-
haviors pointed out in [5] that most keys are just simple and
repeatedly used in practical. Therefore, additional scheme
must be introduced to guarantee the data safety on cloud
ends even the keys are compromised. Our design is based
on the assumption that the physical device of an end user
such as a smartphone is trustworthy. Concepts like Mobile
Edge Computing (MEC) allows data protection done on this
smartphone before outsourcing. Then, the access control
model must be designed and defined to let the end user to
determine which entity can share the EHR data. Moreover,
the proposed scheme must be able to provide the data safety
and privacy under the situation that both cloud server and
key are compromised
Our contributions in this paper include: (1) we design
a user-centric data storage and sharing method in cloud-
based MCPS to protect the safety and privacy of users’
EHR data which could protect data safety and privacy
even when both cloud server and keys are compromised.
(2) We evaluate the feasibility for this system based on
mobile edge computing on a smartphone scenario to prove
the improvement on efficiency compared with standard
encryption algorithms.
We organize this paper following the order below. Sec-
tion 2 discuss the safety and privacy issue in MCPS by
giving an example. Section 3 illustrates our proposed user-
centric EHR data protection system. Section 4 provides the
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2Fig. 1. Medical Cyber-Physical System (MCPS) use cases and applications based on big data.
protection level of the selective encryption algorithm. Next,
Section 5 briefly evaluates the performance on a smartphone
platform. Finally, Section 6 draws the future work and the
conclusion of this study.
2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly discuss the practical issue for
threats over EHR data based on a user’s viewpoint. An
example is given to illustrate the threats we are facing in
a simplified use case. Countermeasures and limitations in
this special MCPS environment are also presented.
2.1 Problem definition and threat models
As pointed in Section 1, on one hand, introducing cloud
service for MCPS brings efficient, reliable and economic data
storage and sharing for both patients and medical institutes,
however, on the other hand, EHR data safety and privacy
are challenged as well.
In this example, we list several threat modes in Fig. 2.
The cloud based MCPS is abstracted as two areas and
several components. Based on an end user’s viewpoint, the
responsible doctor and the personal device such as smart-
phones can be trusted. Once the health data is outsourcing
to other parties in the cloud based MCPS network such as
cloud servers, multiple threats will appear.
First, there are attackers trying to eavesdrop data on
the public communication channel which may compromise
data transmitted in plain text. Then, due to the fact that
repeated keys are commonly used by end users, attackers
may break into the cloud storage by using brute force attacks
based on key dictionary collected from other leakages [6],
[7]. Moreover, the cloud service providers may also try to
mine user’s data to get profit such as data based advertis-
ing which violates privacy [5]. The worse case is that the
cloud service providers may directly hand over plain stored
data for authority’s illegal surveillance without noticing the
users [8].
Protecting EHR data before outsourcing is necessary to
avoid directly eavesdropping over communication channel
or any operations on the cloud ends to compromise end
Fig. 2. A brief example for threats modes of EHR data on cloud based
MPCS.
users’ data safety. However, requiring end users to set
strong and different keys is a system-centric design, and
more importantly, can not fundamentally solve the threats
from attackers with dictionaries. Thus, the design must be
able to avoid data leakage in the worst case assuming that
an attacker has data stolen from cloud servers and the
repeated key leaked from other sources.
2.2 Research motivation
As shown in Fig. 2, the threats come from multiple parties in
the MCPS network. The countermeasure is to design a user-
centric data protection system that protects EHR data in a
limited trust area and see all other parties as untrusted [9].
Thus, the data could still suffer from the leakage of other
communication entities when there are malicious users in
this environment expose the keys.
In this paper, our motivation is to provide safety and pri-
vacy in the cloud-based MCPS against user behaviors such
as repeated key usages through untrusted cloud servers.
Fragmentation will be introduced to be combined with
encryption such that the fragmented data pieces on clouds
cannot be used to leak the stored data even when the key for
this system is leaked. Access control model is also needed
for data sharing with security and privacy, and further,
especially for disease control in this MCPS network.
3We first define the very basic assumptions based on end
user’s viewpoint. The trusted area includes the smart med-
ical devices equipped with processing and communication
modules which forms the edge of the MCPS network. An-
other reasonable assumption is that every user has a trusted
smartphone within the cloud based MCPS network that can
perform communication and calculation tasks. Responsible
doctor, introduced as the other trust party in MCPS network,
must be also considered to be able to access the plain data
for disease control purposes.
Other assumptions are that the Internet transmission
channel cannot be trusted so data outsourced must deploy
protection scheme. The cloud service providers cannot be
entirely trusted. We have to assume that one ”curious” or
”malicious” program sits on one cloud server and is able
to observe all the data stored in the Cloud and transmitted
through the Cloud. In a worse case, not only data stored on
the cloud server but also the key for protection can be used
by this program to sniff the users’ privacy by any means of
analysis or attack for even a small piece of data. The purpose
of this design is to simplify the basic roles in the complicated
cloud based MCPS network. Starting from a user-centric
viewpoint is to use the big data and cloud based MCPS for
better medical treatment purpose while also protect each
user’s safety and privacy.
3 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the design of user-centric secure
data sharing system. First, system architecture is given to
illustrate the idea that protecting data by fragmentation to
avoid direct relationships between keys and data fragments
stored on clouds. A SE algorithm is given to support this
design. Access control model is also given considering the
specialty of data sharing in MCPS.
3.1 System designs
The initial idea is to protect data in a trusted place and then
to fragment the data into fragments with different levels of
importance. A dispersion step will be followed to determine
which data fragments will be stored on cloud servers. The
SE algorithm guarantees that only the keys cannot be used
to decrypt the fragments stored on cloud servers.
In the MCPS practical environment, we could assume
that the biological or medical information is generated on
smart medical devices which are formatted EHR files as
shown in Step 1 in Fig. 3. This health data can be shown
on the medical devices for treatment by doctors and also be
transmitted to the patient’s personal devices such as smart-
phones in this paper. A direct and offline connection can be
built between the medical devices and smartphones for the
data transmission as the Step 2. In this step, the smartphones
will receive the health data with the modification from
doctors as the input. SE methods then will be deployed
on the smartphones to fragment and selectively encrypt the
fragmented data. Considering the limitation of storage and
transmission of smartphones, data piece with low impor-
tance level (called public fragment as shown in Fig. 3) will be
transmitted to cloud servers and the important data piece
(called private fragment as shown in Fig. 3) will be stored on
the smartphones in this scenario.
The SE method and the fragmentation scheme must
be able to guarantee that the private fragment is small in
data size but contains most of the important information
to recover the initial plain data. While the public fragment
must be large in data size but cannot be used to recover the
initial data no matter by attacker or administrators in cloud
servers as it is protected and not related with the keys. For
a further data protection, the private fragment should be
encrypted and backup in a cloud server with higher trust
level in case the loss of smartphones. The secure storage
can be achieved based on an end user’s viewpoint that the
private fragment is carried and there are no worries for any
data leak at the cloud end.
For the EHR data sharing, the end user can always
determine first whether to share with medical institute
by control the data sharing of private fragment just on
smartphones as Step 5 shown in Fig. 3. Once institutes are
authenticated with access to one patient’s health data, the
public fragment can be downloaded from the cloud server
and private fragment can be shared anonymously (remove
the sensitive information such as identity). Thus, the cloud
server, as an efficient data storage and sharing middleware,
is fully deployed and data leaks can be avoided.
3.2 General data protection methods
EHRs data may include a large range of data types with
different formats, including static digital data such as per-
sonal statistics like age and weight, graphics data such
as demographics and radiology images, and data formats
used for medical software such as laboratory test results or
dynamic health statistics. Based on a user-centric viewpoint,
if there are too many options to protect for choosing, it may
cause reluctant to use [5]. Therefore, one general protection
method must be designed to let different digital files with
different formats protected in a simple way.
Traditional encryption algorithms such as AES [10] could
be one choice. However, management of the key will be
a problem as the security property is all relying on the
storage of the key. Assume one scenario that an end user
encrypts all the EHRs with AES and upload the ciphertext
to the cloud servers, data could be leaked once the key is
compromised. According to the user behaviour [11], many
end users might reuse the same keys in different places such
that one leakage of the keys could lead to serious leakage of
privacy data elsewhere. Fragmentation is introduced such
that the attackers cannot crack the data content even the
key is compromised. One approach is to use lossless trans-
formations (DWT) to fragment one digital file into different
fragments with different importance levels [9]. However,
this design is not suitable for protecting EHRs as EHRs are
a series of many different files instead of large data chunks.
In summary, a more practical and deployable method is
needed to protect the EHRs in a manner that can protect
many different files in a general way and compromising key
is not enough to threaten the safety and privacy of the data.
3.3 Selective encryption algorithm
The basic idea is to fragment the digital data in a manner
that make different data fragments related. For instance,
a small subset of the data is used to protect the rest data
4Fig. 3. System architecture based on user-centric viewpoint.
fragment in a lightweight manner. Then protection scheme
such as encryption algorithms can be used to protect the
small subset of the data with a key. A dispersion scheme
is used for the storage that the encrypted small subset of
the data is stored in a secure place such as end user’s
personal device and the rest data fragments are stored in
cloud servers for cost saving purposes. In such case, once
the key is leaked, even the attacker can get access to the
data stored on cloud servers, the data content is still safe as
the key cannot be used to decrypt the fragments stored on
clouds. By this design, the data leakage due to the password
reuse [11] can be avoided even the encryption key is also
leaked.
In this section, we introduce the algorithm to selec-
tively encrypt the data and provide a dispersion method
for further storage. The setting shown in TABLE 1 for the
parameters is used for fitting different file formats of EHR
data. Firstly the EHR data input Dinput (image, database
file, etc) is preprocessed as the file header with all neces-
sary markers for format Dhead and the content C which
is Dinput = Dhead + C . The size of Dhead is normally
ignorable compared with C and it is supposed to be stored
in plaintext locally. Then the C is the input for the SE
algorithm with a key K and a Counter = 0. The key
generation and distribution process are the same with the
standard protocols such as SSL/TLS protocols. The outputs
are the corresponding private fragment PRFc and public
fragment PUFc.
TABLE 1
Major notations used in this algorithm and their definitions.
Notation Definition
Dinput Input EHR data files
Dhead File headers containing markers such as formats
C EHR data contents
K Secret key used to protect the data
Counter an integer for counting processing sequence
PUFc Corresponding public fragment
PRFc Corresponding private fragment
As in the algorithm, each file content C is processed
as many 256-bit units, even very small EHR files can be
processed independently which can further reduce the mod-
ification times if only some small EHR files are modified.
The basic idea is to use the keys to protect the important part
which is the private fragment. Then the fragment combined
with the keys will be used to protect the public fragment
with an approximated one-time pad protection.
More details are listed in the Algorithm 1. We initialize
the algorithm in Line 1-3 to set all parameters and also
read input EHR data content C as N units with each
unit of 256-bit size: C = {C1, C2, ..., CN}. Then each data
unit Ci will be firstly fragmented into 8 fragments of 32
bit size (Ci = {C1i , C2i , ..., C8i }) in Line 5. In Line 6, a
pseudorandom number generator will be used to determine
which fragment will be the private fragment (Cji ) and the
rest 7 fragments (Ci − Cji ) will form the public fragment
for this 512 bit data unit. In Line 7-9, the protection for the
public fragment is done by Xoring the Ci − Cji with the
Hash results of Cji , K , and Counter. The processing for
the sequence of C is done in a for loop in this Algorithm.
However, if the pseudorandom number sequence j is pre-
calculated, the processing for the sequence of C can be then
parallelized for better performance.
In this algorithm, the SHA-256 function [12] is intro-
duced to generate bit sequences with a 50% difference even
when there is only 1 bit changed in the input. Thus, bit
sequence used to protect the PUFc by xoring is unpre-
dictable which can be seen as the approximated one-time
pad protection [13]. The decryption process of this algorithm
is symmetric to the encryption algorithm. Data recovery can
only be achieved when both private and public fragments
are collected with the correct keys. More security analysis
will be introduced in the Section 4 to prove the protection
results.
3.4 Mobile edge computing
In traditional designs, MEC technology is usually used to
offload calculations from the clouds end which can further
avoid the data transmission between edge devices and cloud
servers [14]. Typical edge devices such as smartphones are
equipped with processing cores but limited storage spaces
which fits the needs for deploying MEC to process data and
upload data to cloud servers. In this paper, we claim that in
some scenarios, MEC designs can also enhance the security
level for personal data. For instance, as long as the data
is outsourcing in plaintext to the communication channel,
potential attackers might get the data by eavesdropping
as shown in Fig. 2. Data leakages as shown in [8] and
5ALGORITHM 1: Selective encryption algorithm with fragmen-
tation
Input: Data Dinput and Key K.
Output: Public fragment PUFc and private fragment PRFc.
1: Dinput = Dhead + C;/*Protection on only the data
content.*/
2: C = {C1, C2, ..., CN}; /*Read input data C as N units with
each unit Ci size as 256 bits*/
3: PRFc = {};PUFc = {};/*Initialize the public and private
fragments as null sequence sets*/
4: Counter = 0;
5: for i← 1 to N do
6: Ci = {C1i , C2i , ..., C8i }; /*Fragment Ci equally into 8
sequences with each sequence Cji size as 32 bits*/
7: j = PRNG(K); /*j is an integer from a pseudorandom
number generator with key as a seed and j ∈ [1, 8]*/
8: Hi = SHA256(C
j
i +K + Counter); /*Hi is a 256-bit
sequence generated by Hashing Cji , K, and Counter*/
9: PRFc = Add(PRFc, C
j
i ); /*C
j
i is collected into the private
fragment PRF */
10: PUF ic = XOR(Ci − Cji , truncate(Hi)); /*Public fragment
PUF ic for Ci is protected by xoring the 7 rest 64-bit
sequences with the truncated Hi*/
11: Counter = Counter + 1; /*Counter updated every loop to
guarantee different Hi even Cis are the same*/
12: end for
13: PRFc = ENCAES(PRFc,K); /*Private fragment PRFc is
protected by AES with key K*/
14: Return PRFc, PUFc;
in Facebook [15] recently have proven that totally trusting
cloud service providers is not wise.
Thus, as the smartphones are normally physically in
each end user’s hand, the basic assumption is that the
end user’s digital device can be trusted. The protection on
smartphones then outsourcing data can protect sensitive
data from potential attackers and data leakage at cloud
ends. Of course, Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) [16] is
promising to provide full privacy for storage or calculation
but it seems the performance issues are still the obstacles
in practical. Thus, in this paper, we claim that the MEC can
bring safety and privacy for end user’s data as long as the
protection method is implemented on smartphones before
outsourcing.
4 PROTECTION ANALYSIS
In this section, we test the protection levels for several
typical EHR files. As mentioned in Section 3, the private
fragment is protected by AES and a public fragment is
protected by the SE algorithm. First, we assume the AES
encryption algorithm is secure (AES is used as the standard
encryption algorithm in this paper but can be replaced
with other encryption algorithms). Then the threat model is
that the attackers may have access to the public fragments.
Thus, we need to prove that the public fragments cannot be
used to recover the original data content. In order to meet
this requirement, the public fragments should be similar to
random values no matter what the input file format is.
4.1 Statistical analysis on the public and protected
fragments
In this analysis, two main criteria are used to test that the
randomness level compared with the input EHR data and
the output public fragments. Firstly, we test one typical
medical image in Digital Imaging and Communications in
Medicine DICOM format [17]. This image format is common
to be used in medical image storage and transmission. As
shown in Fig. 4, we present the input DICOM image (a)
and the corresponding public fragment (b). A Probability
Density Function (PDF) analysis is given as well to indicate
that the byte value distribution of the public fragment is
nearly random. Then according to our dispersion design,
this public fragment is supposed to be stored on cloud
servers. Even the cloud server is somehow compromised
and data is leaked, this public fragment file cannot be used
to recover the original DICOM image as the byte values
in it are uniformly distributed which can be seen as nearly
random.
Fig. 4. (a) Original DICOM image, (b) protected DICOM image, and (c)
their PDFs.
As there are actually many different file types of EHR,
we test some typical file formats to prove that the designed
protection scheme can always generate public fragments
that are similar to random data. One important criteria
is to measure the entropy values for the input EHR data
and the corresponding public fragments. Entropy values
of a data sequence is a parameter that measures the level
of uncertainty in a random variable [18]. In our test, the
entropy values are used to prove the high randomness level
of the public fragments. Thus, we calculate the entropy
values for the input EHR data and also the corresponding
public fragments. It is easy to calculate for a random source
emitting 2N symbols, the entropy should be N . In this
design, as the data are always seen as 8-bit per element,
the pixel data have 28 possible values. As such, the entropy
for a ”true random” information source must be 8. For our
case, the entropy of the public fragments is always more
than 7.99 which proves high randomness. In TABLE 2, we
test also two EHR data samples downloaded from ONC
website [19]. According to the entropy values, the high level
of randomness is achieved compared with the input EHR
database format files.
In summary, with the different tests for some other
different EHR file formats, we get similar results that the
high randomness level is achieved for the public fragments.
Thus, according to the threat mode described in Section 2,
neither the attacker nor the cloud admins cannot compro-
mise the EHR data content even with full access to the public
fragments on clouds.
6TABLE 2
Entropy tests for the protected public fragments of DICOM images and
EHR data samples.
Notation Entropy of input files Entropy of PUFc
DICOM image 1 6.402 7.9992
DICOM image 2 6.307 7.9993
EHR data sample 1 4.887 7.9970
EHR data sample 2 4.992 7.9987
4.2 Privacy-preserving data sharing with user-centric
designs
Once the EHRs are protected and dispersed to different
storage space, the secure storage step is finished. For further
data sharing, the data sharing protocol is shown in Fig. 5.
Due to the specialty of the medical system, the respon-
sible doctor should have a higher access control role in
this protocol to guarantee serious conditions like spreadable
disease should be reported in the first time. As shown in Fig.
4, the responsible doctor can directly access the medical data
with the smart medical devices. The scheme proposed in this
paper is used to protect the EHR data when the data needs
to be shared between other parties through untrusted public
clouds. Thus, the delay caused by the security functions
will only affect on the communication between other parties
such as remote hospitals. Then the end user should have the
private and public fragments for the EHR data stored on the
smartphone and cloud servers respectively. In this protocol,
the trust entities are the doctors, disease control authority
and the end user himself. The other entity who wants to
get the EHR data is untrusted and can only get the public
fragments without the authority from the end user.
One important user behavior is that the users are more
likely to use the simple key and reuse the same key [5].
The direct result by this behavior is that the attackers might
easily guess the key which will let the full encryption pro-
tection useless. The other scenario is that once one database
is compromised, attackers might try to compromise other
databases with the dictionary formed by compromised keys
which leads to more serious data leakages.
Considering the threat models listed in Section 2.1, once
the key used to encrypt the private fragment is exposed and
acquired by a malicious party, the data is still protected as
long as the smartphone is secure. Furthermore, the mali-
cious might also get access to the public fragment stored
on the cloud server. However, as the encryption key is used
to protect the private fragment and the public fragment is
protected based on the plain text of the private fragment,
the data is still protected as the encryption key cannot be
used to decrypt the public fragment. Considering the worse
case that an end user is repeatedly using the same key for
encryption and the public fragment is always vulnerable
due to the cloud server is curious, the data is still protected
as the private fragment is secure. Moreover, even if the
attacker could pretend to be valid party for one time to get
the private fragment for one EHR data file which would
compromise this particular EHR data, the other EHR data
files are still protected as the end user could still deny the
access for the private fragments of the other EHR data files.
4.3 Discussion
In this work, we introduced the fragmentation and dis-
persion for outsourcing and storage for designing the SE
algorithm. The basic idea is to first use the key to protect
a small part of the data, and then to use this small part of
the data to protect the rest large part of the data. In such
case, the key is not directly related with the large part of
the data which is supposed to outsourced on cloud servers.
This could defend the data leakage due to reuse of password
that is even the attackers know the key and have access
to the public fragments, the data is still secure. However,
there are other viewpoints such as the security level of
smartphones are difficult to guarantee as a smartphone
might get stolen or compromised by malicious applications.
In fact, the security of operating systems on smartphones is
not in the scope of this paper.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The MCPS is a system that requires low latency especially
for critical health conditions. Thus, for the EHR data sharing
with remote communication entity, we evaluate the pro-
posed algorithms on a smart phone platform to prove the
efficiency of the proposed algorithm. The baseline model to
be compared is to encrypt all EHR data on the smartphone
end with AES-128 with CBC mode and then outsource the
cipher texts. In the practical data sharing scenario as shown
in Fig. 5, the actual latency of data sharing is consisted
by many factors such as the data transmission latency,
the latency of access control operation, and the latency
caused by data protection. As we are proposing a novel
data protection scheme, in this section, we only evaluate the
execution time of the proposed algorithm compared with
the standard encryption algorithm. For the other latency
such as transmission latency, we assume that the latency for
our proposal is the same with the scenario when standard
encryption algorithm is deployed as we do not increase the
data volume for transmission.
Actually, according to the SE algorithm, there are only
two heavy calculation tasks involved: AES encryption (as-
sume as AES-128 with CBC mode) and Hash operation
(SHA-256 in this paper). Firstly, the input data content C
is cut into many units with unit size 256 bits. There are 32
bits selected to form the private fragment and one SHA-256
operation will be performed for this unit. Thus, for each
input data content C , there will be 12.5% (every 32 bits out
of 256 bits) to be encrypted with AES-128 and there is only
one Hash operation for every 256 bits which means there
will be 32k Hash operations of SHA-256 for 1 MB EHR data.
We evaluate the execution speeds for the main calcu-
lation tasks on iPhone 8 Plus which equips the new A11
processor which contains six ARMv8 CPU cores (2 high-
performance 2.53 GHz and 4 high-efficiency 1.42 GHz) [20].
Based on the experimentation in [21], the A11 processor
could enjoy the huge acceleration brought by the ARMv8
crypto extensions and single precision math. The AES-128
with CBC mode could achieve 912.347 MB/s and the SHA-
256 performance is 1717.28 MB/s. Thus, the performance
evaluated for the proposed algorithm is shown in Fig. 6.
We tested the evaluated time consumed by the baseline
scenario which is the AES-128 with CBC mode for the data
7Fig. 5. EHR data sharing model with access control from an end user.
Fig. 6. Evaluated performance comparison between proposed SE algo-
rithm with the AES-128.
content C . Then, we test the time consumed by the AES
(AES-128 with CBC mode) for the PRF of C , the SHA-
256 for the data content C , and the evaluated SE which
is the total time consumed by the two main calculation
tasks respectively. The evaluation result of the proposed
SE algorithm on the iPhone 8 Plus platform with the ac-
celeration of ARMv8 crypto extensions is 2.2GB/s which is
approximately 2.3 times faster than the baseline scenario of
AES-128 with CBC mode. Although the evaluation for the
individual calculation tasks show that the execution time of
this algorithm is much less than using full encryption with
AES, there are still other factors to cause latency for the
practical implementation. However, according to the test
in this paper, we prove that on a smartphone platform,
it is faster to use the proposed SE method than the full
encryption.
6 FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
For the future work, we will deploy this scheme with a more
practical environment such as a multi-cloud scenario [22]
and also discuss the possibility to define different cloud
servers with different trust levels and disperse all frag-
ments on clouds with either encryption or SE. Also, more
implementation works to test the speed of AES and Hash
on different smartphone platforms are also needed in the
future.
In this paper, we presented an EHR data protection and
sharing system for MCPS based a user-centric viewpoint.
We aimed to solve the threats to data safety considering end
users’ behaviors that keys might be reused and leaked from
other sources. A SE algorithm combined with fragmentation
and dispersion for storage is designed to protect data even
when both the key and the public fragment of EHR data on
clouds are leaked. The test for the protection results proved
that our algorithm can avoid data recovery even with both
key and public fragments compromised.
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